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Abstract:
In the interpretation of experimental data, one is actually looking for plausible explanations. We look 
for a measure of plausibility, with which we can compare different possible explanations, and which 
can be combined when there are different sets of data. This is contrasted to the conventional measure 
for probabilities as well as to the proposed measure of possibilities. We define what characteristics  this 
measure of plausibility should have.
In getting to the conception of this measure, we explore the relation of plausibility to abductive 
reasoning, and to Bayesian probabilities. We also compare with the Dempster-Schaefer theory of 
evidence, which also has its own definition for plausibility. Abduction can be associated with 
biconditionality in inference rules, and this provides a platform to relate to the Collins-Michalski theory 
of plausibility. Finally, using a formalism for wiring logic onto Hopfield neural networks, we ask if this 
is relevant in obtaining this measure.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, uncertainty in propositions is handled through the concept of probability with its 
statistical interpretation. It is however, a bit strange when such an approach which is based on counting 
events, is applied to hypotheses, like explanatory propositions. For example, in the interpretation of 
experimental data, one is actually looking for plausible explanations to describe the observed data. 
Whilst probability may be seen to underlie data measurement, a statistical picture for explanations may 
be viable only in a multiple-world universe.
We thus seek a measure for plausibility, with which we can compare different possible explanations. 
Furthermore, this measure of plausibility should allow appropriate combination when different 
explanations and/or sets of data are combined. 
UNCERTAINTY MEASURES
Probabilities are calculated from the numbers of events satisfying respective propositions from a total 
set and are normalized. Thus probabilities for alternative explanations are exclusive, and the more 
alternatives there are, the less are the values for probabilities in general. Plausibility, on the other hand, 
should not behave as such.. The plausibility of a proposition should not depend on the plausibility of an 
alternative proposition, much less reduced by it. 
In logical conjunctions, probabilities are combined by multiplication, and in disjunctions, by addition, 
when the atoms are exclusive:
P(X∧Y) = P(X)×P(Y)              
P(X∨Y) = P(X)+P(Y)-P(X∧Y)
This does not necessarily follow for plausibilities; in fact, for example, intuitively it does not seem 
correct that the plausibility of (X or Y) is the sum of the individual plausibilities of X and Y.
Plausibility seems closer to the notion of possibility [1] (based on fuzzy sets, thus rather similar to 
fuzzy logic [2]) when combinations are concerned. Disjunctions of possibilities return the maximum 
values, while conjunctions of possibilities involve the minimum values:
pos(X∧Y) ≤  min(pos(X),pos(Y))    
pos(X∨Y) = max(pos(X),pos(Y))    
Other than probabilities and possibilities, other uncertainty measures (sometimes with similar names) 
have been proposed by, for example Dempster and Shafer [3], further studied below, and others.   
PLAUSIBILITY
Let us now define what characteristics  the measure of plausibility should have.
 
• We can have a normalized scale from 0, which would denote something not at all plausible, to 1 
denoting something fully plausible. Let us denote plausibility by 'pl':
pl(X) = 0 : X is not all plausible
pl(X) = 1 : X is fully plausible   
• Plausibilities are not exclusive. For example, even when X and Y are not logically compatible, 
yet X can be fully plausible at the same time that Y is fully plausible:
                    pl(X) + pl(Y) > 1  though X ∩ Y = ∅
• Like possibility, and unlike probability, plausibility is not self-dual. That is, 
  pl(X) ≠ 1-pl(¬X).
In another words, when something  is not at all plausible, it does not mean that it is fully plausible that 
that something is untrue. Let us include negative values for plausibility to enable the representation of 
negations, and require that 
  pl(¬X) = - pl(X). 
This means that now
  pl(X) ∈ [-1,1],
giving values for fully plausibly false on the one end, and fully plausibly true on the other, with non-
plausibility (‘non-relevance’) in the middle.
A Wiktionary definition of plausibility is “seemingly or apparently valid, likely, or acceptable”. This 
suggests that plausibility may be related to abduction.
ABDUCTIVE REASONING
Abduction (see e.g. [4]), first described by Peirce more than a hundred years ago, is the process of 
arriving at the premise which would 'explain' some situation. Given that the set of propositions C 
formally follows from the set of propositions A subject to the set of logical rules T, then the derivation 
of C from T and A is deduction, that of T from C and A is induction, and that of A from T and C is 
abduction. Note that the abduced set is sufficient, but not necessary for C to follow from T, and may be 
one of many alternatives; in abduction one also usually looks for the most natural explanation in the 
form of the most economical one.
Given a set of true propositions, then, an abduced proposition is a plausible proposition. Plausibility 
then is a measure of how good is the proposition in explaining the available facts. It can be related to 
how much of the requirement for sufficiency has been satisfied.
BAYESIAN PROBABILITIES
When propositions have probabilistic values, then abduction is related to conditional probabilities. 
Bayes' theorem states that the probability for θ given x,
P(θ |x) =  P(x |θ ) P(θ ) /  P(x)
depends on the conditional probability, or likelihood, of x given θ, multiplied by the prior probability 
for θ. Abduction being the 'reverse' of deduction is parallel to the conditional probability being the 
'reverse' of likelihood. 
Conditional probabilities then present a possible model for plausibilities. Combinations of plausibilities 
in inferences can copy those in Bayesian networks [5]. However, the determination of prior 
probabilities pose a problem for calculating conditional probabilities.  
DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [3] has its own definition for plausibility which is based on 
some belief function. Plausibility for a set of propositions is the sum of “belief masses” of other sets of 
propositions which intersect with this set, while belief is that for those which are subsets, and they 
bound the probability:
bel(X) ≤ P(X) ≤ pl(X)
and are related,
pl(X) = 1 - bel(¬X).
The theory prescribes a method for combining belief masses from different assignments, along the lines 
of Bayesian theory. To obtain the plausibility of a combined set of propositions, one has to recalculate 
using the primary definition.
The assignment of belief masses is problematic here, and also, their association with probabilities is 
misleading. Furthermore, plausibility being the upper bound for belief suggests a rather subjective 
definition.    
BICONDITIONALITY AND COLLINS-MICHALSKI
A theory for plausible reasoning has been proposed by Collins and Michalski [6]. It has several types of 
inferences, namely mutual implication, mutual dependency, generalization, specialization, and 
similarity/analogy. A drawback is that it has a restrictively large number of parameters to model 
uncertainty.
The inferences existing in Collins-Michalski theory are mostly explained by biconditionality, wherein 
implications are taken to also include some degree of equivalences [7]. This relates to abduction, as 
abduction coincides with deduction when implications are replaced by equivalences. In the 
probabilistic picture, this is like equating the conditional probability to the likelihood,
P(θ |x) =  P(x |θ )
Of course this is not rational; after all, this is plausible reasoning. However, this supports the 
notion that plausibility has an abductive basis.
CONNECTIONIST
It has been shown [8,9] that logic can be hardwired onto a Hopfield neural network [10]. The Hopfield 
network minimizes a Lyapunov or “energy” function related to the synaptic strengths [11]. By writing 
an expression yielding a value proportional to unsatisfied clauses, the network then searches for an 
optimum logical interpretation of the propositional atoms, represented by neurons. This then gives the 
values for the synapses. In some sense, the logic is contained in the synapses.
From the synaptic strengths then, we can make inferences about the logical clauses [12]. This may be 
helpful in our search for a measure of plausibility.
PLAUSIBILITY, PLAUSIBLY
Finally, we can make some preliminary moves in the direction of plausibility. Taking an abductive 
interpretation, the more of the set of existing ‘measured’ propositions C a hypothetical proposition Ai 
forces, the more plausible Ai should be. Perhaps then the plausibility of Ai corresponds to the fraction of 
propositions in C that is forced correct (both, either true or false) by Ai. If Ai does not have any effect on 
C then Ai should have plausibility 0, and if forces all of the known propositions C to be correct, then Ai 
have plausibility 1.
What is of interest is the combination of plausibilities. Is it possible to have simple combining rules for 
conjunctions and disjunctions, for example? For propositions Ai and Aj each forcing disjoint subsets of 
C and having no joint effects on the correctness of any subset, then simply
pl(Ai∧ Aj) = pl(Ai) + pl(Aj).
In the case of the existence of some common proposition Ci forced by both Ai and Aj, i.e. the rule base T 
contains
Ai → Ci
Aj → Ci
then the value is less, as also implicated by the upper limit of 1 on the value of plausibilities, while in 
the case that Ai and Aj have a joint effect on Ci, e.g.
Ai∧ Aj  → Ci
then the value is more. In general, plausibility of conjunctions can be complicated. It may simplify 
somewhat for singleton C’s, whence the measure would involve some kind of probability, and these 
phenomena would be averaged out.  
Having plausibility related to fraction of forced correctness is compatible with our previous definition 
of negative plausibilities. For disjoint hypotheses Ai and Aj, using de Morgan’s theorem, the plausibility 
for a disjunction is similarly given,
pl(Ai∨Aj) = pl(Ai) + pl(Aj),
a bit counter-intuitively. Proceeding, thus
pl(Ai → Aj) = pl(Aj) - pl(Ai).
Interestingly, this has some similarity to synaptic weight assignment in connectionist logic previously 
discussed where whilst some weights are increased with the addition of a clause, some are decreased.
Using hardwired logic on connectionist networks, and forcing the correct values for the neurons in C, 
and that for a hypothesis, the final network state yields the least value for the energy function, which 
corresponds to the number of clauses unsatisfied. This intuitively should also represent the number of 
errors in C, allowing an estimation of the plausibility of the hypothesis. For this, synaptic weights, or 
equivalently, clauses in T need to be known explicitly; however, this can be obtained [12] through 
Hebbian learning. 
 
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have explored the concept of plausibility and attempted to characterize a measure for 
it. In particular, we have taken an abductive basis, and conjecture that a hypothesis is more plausible if 
it forces more of the measured truth. For simple cases we can write down the rules for combinations. 
We also indicated how plausibility can be measured using a logic neural network.
This exploratory proposal for plausibility needs to be further investigated, especially for the non-trivial 
cases of combinations. It is hoped that combination of plausibilities would help in the interpretation of 
combinations of measurements in experimental data.
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